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One of the most intriguing and exciting developments 
in neuroscience in recent years has been the discovery of 
a mechanism that unifies action perception and action 
execution1–3. The essence of this mechanism — called 
the mirror mechanism — is the following: each time an 
individual observes another individual performing 
an action, a set of neurons that encode that action is 
activated in the observer’s cortical motor system.
The mirror mechanism is present in many cortical 
areas and brain centres of birds, monkeys and humans. 
The basic functions of these areas and centres vary con-
siderably, from song production to the organization of 
goal-directed motor acts, to emotional processes. Thus, 
like other basic mechanisms (for example, excitatory 
postsynaptic potentials), the functional role of the mir-
ror mechanism depends on its anatomical location, with 
its function ranging from recognition of the song of 
conspecifics in birds4,5 to empathy in humans6.
The aim of this article is not to review the vast 
literature on the mirror mechanism, but to focus on one spe-
cific circuit endowed with mirror properties: the parieto- 
frontal action observation–action execution circuit. The 
reason for this choice is twofold. First, the proposed 
interpretation of the function of the parieto-frontal 
circuit as a mechanism that enables individuals to under-
stand the actions and intentions of others (mirror-based 
action understanding) represented a paradigm shift in the 
classical view that these cognitive functions depend on 
higher-level mental processes. Second, mostly as a reaction 
to this new perspective, there have been attempts to 
interpret the functions of the action observation–action 
execution circuit in a way that minimizes or even denies its 
role in cognition. For these reasons, a review of the data on 
the mirror mechanism in the action observation–action 
execution network seems timely and necessary.
In this Review, we examine first what the parieto-frontal 
action observation–action execution circuit encodes in 
monkeys and humans and then discuss its possible func-
tional relevance for cognition. After examining different 
views on these issues, we conclude that the parieto-fron-
tal mechanism allows an individual to understand the 
actions of another individual ‘from the inside’ and gives 
the observing individual a first-person grasp of the motor 
goals and intentions of another individual.
The parieto-frontal mirror network
The monkey parieto-frontal network. The mirror 
mechanism was originally discovered in the ventral 
premotor cortex of the macaque monkey (area F5)1–3. 
Single-neuron recordings showed that this area contains 
neurons — mirror neurons — that discharge both when 
a monkey executes a specific motor act and when it 
observes another individual performing the same motor 
act. Mirror neurons do not fire in response to a simple 
presentation of objects, including food. Most of them do 
not respond or respond only weakly to the observation of 
the experimenter performing a motor act (for example, 
grasping) without a target object7.
Area F5 has recently been divided into three sectors: 
F5c, F5p and F5a8–9 (FIG. 1). Mirror neurons were 
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Mirror mechanism
The mechanism that unifies 
perception and action, 
transforming sensory 
representations of the 
behaviour of others into 
motor representations of 
the same behaviour in the 
observer’s brain.
Motor act
A movement with a specific 
motor goal (for example, 
reaching, grasping and 
manipulating). The successful 
achievement of its goal 
represents the reinforcement 
of the motor act.
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Abstract | The parieto-frontal cortical circuit that is active during action observation is the 
circuit with mirror properties that has been most extensively studied. Yet, there remains 
controversy on its role in social cognition and its contribution to understanding the actions 
and intentions of other individuals. Recent studies in monkeys and humans have shed light 
on what the parieto-frontal cortical circuit encodes and its possible functional relevance for 
cognition. We conclude that, although there are several mechanisms through which one can 
understand the behaviour of other individuals, the parieto-frontal mechanism is the only one 
that allows an individual to understand the action of others ‘from the inside’ and gives the 
observer a first-person grasp of the motor goals and intentions of other individuals.
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The comprehension of an 
observed action based on the 
activation of a motor 
programme in the observer’s 
brain. The observed action is 
understood ‘from the inside’ as 
a motor possibility, rather than 
‘from the outside’ as a mere 
visual description.
Superior temporal sulcus
(STS). This sulcus separates the 
superior temporal gyrus from 
the middle temporal gyrus. 
Some of the areas in the STS 
encode biological motion. 
Although connected with the 
parietal areas of the 
parieto-frontal mirror network, 
STS areas cannot be 
considered mirror areas 
because of their lack of motor 
properties.
Movement
A displacement of joints or 
body parts without a specific 
goal. It can be generated 
spontaneously or produced 
artificially by electrical or 
magnetic stimulation of 
motor areas.
originally recorded in the cortical convexity that corre-
sponds to F5c1–3. However, functional MRI (fMRI) data 
showed that the other two areas also respond to observing 
a grasping action8.
Mirror neurons are also present in the rostral part 
of the inferior parietal lobule (Ipl), particularly in area 
pFG10–12 and the anterior intraparietal area (AIp)9,13 
(FIG. 1). both these areas are heavily connected with 
F5: pFG mostly with F5c, and the AIp with F5a14. both 
area pFG and the AIp receive higher-order visual infor-
mation from the cortex located inside the superior temporal 
sulcus (STS)13–14. STS areas, like mirror areas, encode bio-
logical motion, but they lack motor properties. They are 
therefore not part of the mirror system in a strict sense. 
The AIp also receives connections from the middle 
temporal gyrus15. This input could provide the mirror 
areas with information concerning object identity. 
Finally, area F5 is connected with area F6 — the pre-
supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) — and with the 
prefrontal cortex (area 46)16. The prefrontal cortex is also 
richly connected with the AIp16. The frontal inputs con-
trol the selection of self-generated and stimulus-driven 
actions according to the intentions of the agent17.
It was recently shown that, in addition to areas pFG and 
AIp, two other areas of the parietal lobe contain mirror 
neurons: the lateral intraparietal area and the ventral 
intraparietal area. The mirror properties of neurons in 
these areas are not the focus of this Review but are briefly 
discussed in BOX 1.
The human parieto-frontal network. There is convinc-
ing evidence that an action observation–action execu-
tion mirror circuit also exists in humans. This evidence 
comes from brain imaging, transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS), electroencephalography (eeG) and 
magnetoencephalography (MeG) studies.
brain imaging studies have shown that, as in the mon-
key, this action observation–action execution mirror cir-
cuit is formed by two main regions: the inferior section of 
the precentral gyrus plus the posterior part of the inferior 
frontal gyrus; and the inferior parietal lobule, includ-
ing the cortex located inside the intraparietal sulcus18. 
Additional cortical areas (such as the dorsal premotor cor-
tex and the superior parietal lobule) have also been occa-
sionally found to be active during action observation and 
execution19–21. Although it is possible that their activation 
is due to a mirror mechanism, it is equally possible that it 
reflects motor preparation. In support of this interpreta-
tion are single-neuron data from monkeys showing that 
these areas are involved in covert motor preparation22–23. 
As for the superior parietal lobule, although its activation 
is typically absent in studies in which the experimenters 
use distal motor acts as visual stimuli, it is prominent 
when volunteers observe proximal arm movements that 
are directed to a particular location in space24.
Single-subject fMRI analyses have recently provided 
evidence that other cortical areas (for example, the pri-
mary and secondary somatosensory cortices and the 
middle temporal cortex) also become active during 
action observation and action execution21. It has been 
suggested21 that these activations outside of the ‘classi-
cal’ mirror areas are caused by additional mechanisms 
(for example, internal models) that are triggered by the 
mirror mechanism. These activations would enrich 
the information about the actions of other individuals 
that the mirror mechanism provides.
A tale of two populations. Some authors have recently 
argued that the activation of the same areas during 
action observation and action execution is not suffi-
cient to prove the existence of the mirror mechanism in 
humans25. Instead, they have suggested that, in humans, 
motor areas have distinct, segregated populations of vis-
ual and motor neurons, the visual neurons discharging 
during action observation and the motor neurons during 
action execution. They proposed to use the ‘repetition–
suppression’ technique — that is, a technique based on 
the progressive reduction of a physiological response to 
repeated stimuli to prove this point25. If mirror neurons 
exist in humans, they should ‘adapt’ when the observa-
tion of a motor act is followed by the execution of that 
motor act, and vice versa.
 The ‘adaptation’ effects are, in general, difficult to 
interpret26. Adaptation occurs at the synaptic level and 
should therefore be present only when information 
repeatedly reaches a neuron through the same or largely 
common pathways27. This input commonality is typically 
absent when mirror neurons are activated during action 
observation and execution. during action observation, 
the input to the parieto-frontal circuit arrives from higher-
order visual areas (for example, the STS)16 whereas, during 
voluntary movement, it mostly comes from the frontal 
lobes17. The results of adaptation experiments therefore 
depend on the design of the experimental paradigm and 
Figure 1 | The parieto-frontal mirror network. Lateral view of the macaque brain.  
The coloured areas represent the areas of the parieto-frontal circuit containing mirror 
neurons: the ventral premotor cortex (area F5), area PFG (located between parietal 
areas PF and PG) and the anterior intraparietal area (AIP). Note that the intraparietal 
sulcus (IPS) has been opened (light yellow) to show the areas inside. The parieto-frontal 
circuit receives high-order visual information from areas located inside the superior 
temporal sulcus (STS) and the inferior temporal lobe (IT). Neither of these temporal 
regions has motor properties. The parieto-frontal circuit is under control of the frontal 
lobe (area F6 or pre-supplementary motor area and the ventral prefrontal cortex (VPF)). 
The inset provides an enlarged view of area F5, showing also its sectors (F5a and F5p) 
buried inside the arcuate sulcus. IAS, inferior limb of the arcuate sulcus; LIP, lateral 
intraparietal area; VIP, ventral intraparietal area.
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on the stimuli used. These considerations could explain 
why the results of repetition–suppression experiments 
have been contradictory. Although some authors found 
evidence of the mirror mechanism in the parietal28 or the 
frontal nodes29, others obtained negative results30–31.
Regardless of the empirical data that may help to 
define some properties of the parieto-frontal mirror 
mechanism, the logic of the two-population story is 
flawed. Assuming that neurons in motor areas respond-
ing to action observation are merely visual neurons 
implies that motor areas contain a large number of ‘dis-
placed’ visual neurons and that these neurons do not 
communicate with their ‘neighbour’ motor neurons. 
both these assumptions are hard to reconcile with what 
is known about the organization of the cerebral cortex. 
Most importantly, TMS studies have shown a clear con-
gruence between the observed motor act and the acti-
vated motor representation32–36. Thus, if higher-order 
sensory information describing a motor act reaches 
motor neurons that encode that same motor act, these 
motor neurons are mirror neurons by definition. 
Humans do not differ from monkeys in this respect.
What do parieto-frontal mirror neurons encode?
Evidence for goal coding in monkeys. The crucial 
issue concerning the parieto-frontal mirror neurons 
is their role in cognition. If this mirror mechanism is 
fundamental to understanding actions and intentions, 
the classical view — that the motor system has a role 
only in movement generation — has to be rejected and 
replaced by the view that the motor system is also one 
of the major players in cognitive functions. To address 
this fundamental issue, a preliminary problem must 
first be solved: what do the parieto-frontal mirror 
neurons encode when they discharge in response to 
the observation of the actions of others?
A way to solve this problem is to examine what mir-
ror neurons encode when they discharge during motor 
behaviour. what is recorded in single-neuron studies 
during both action execution and observation are action 
potentials — that is, neuronal output. Thus, having deter-
mined what neurons encode during the execution of an 
agent’s own motor act, one also knows what they encode 
when they are triggered by the agent’s observation 
of a motor behaviour of others.
early experiments on area F5 found that most of the 
motor neurons in this area encode motor acts (that is, 
goal-related movements, such as grasping) rather than 
movements (that is, body-part displacements without a 
specific goal, such as finger flexion)37–38. A recent study 
provided compelling evidence that this is the case39. This 
study describes single-neuron recordings from monkeys 
that were trained to grasp objects using two types of pliers: 
normal pliers, which require typical grasping movements 
of the hand, and ‘reverse’ pliers, which require hand move-
ments executed in the reverse order (that is, first closing 
and then opening the fingers). The results showed that 
F5 neurons discharged during the same phase of grasp-
ing in both conditions, regardless of whether this involved 
opening or closing of the hand (FIG. 2).
The functional properties of Ipl motor neurons are 
similar to those of F5 neurons: the goal of the executed 
motor acts is the parameter that is encoded by Ipl neurons 
that fire during the execution of motor acts11,40–42.
The mirror neurons in F5 and Ipl do not differ in 
their motor properties from parieto-frontal motor neu-
rons that do not have visual properties1–3. Thus, when 
they fire in response to motor act observation, they send 
 Box 1 | Mirror neurons in other parietal areas
The cortical motor system in primates consists of a series of parieto-frontal circuits encoding different types of motor 
behaviour, among which are hand grasping, mouth and head movements, arm reaching and various types of eye 
movements. These circuits are activated by specific sets of sensory inputs that are conveyed to the parietal lobe from 
somatosensory, visual and auditory areas. In this Review, we focus on the mirror properties of the circuit formed in the 
monkey by parietal areas PFG and the anterior intraparietal area (AIP), and frontal area F5. Recently it was shown that 
two other areas of the parietal lobe also have mirror neurons: the lateral intraparietal area (LIP), which with the frontal 
eye field forms a circuit involved in the organization of eye movements; and the ventral intraparietal area (VIP), which is 
buried in the intraparietal sulcus and with frontal area F4 forms a circuit transforming somatosensory and visual stimuli 
that are presented around the monkey into head, mouth and arm movements (FIG. 1).
The properties of mirror neurons located in area LIP have been described by Shepherd and colleagues97. They found 
that a set of LIP neurons fired both when the monkey looked in the neuron-preferred direction and when it saw another 
monkey looking in the same direction. Interestingly, another subset of LIP neurons that discharged when the recorded 
monkey looked towards a certain direction was, by contrast, suppressed when the observed monkey looked in the same 
direction. The authors suggested that LIP mirror neurons contribute to the sharing of attention between individuals.
Mirror neurons in area VIP in the monkey have been described by Ishida and colleagues98. Previous studies showed 
that VIP neurons encode tactile and visual stimuli delivered in the peripersonal space of the monkey99,100. Ishida and 
colleagues showed that some of these neurons also respond to stimuli presented in the peripersonal space of an 
individual located approximately 1 m from the monkey and facing it. Although motor responses were not studied by 
this group, area VIP is connected with area F4, which represents peripersonal space and the neurons of which discharge 
during reaching movements. It is plausible, therefore, that neuronal responses that seem to be induced by visual stimuli 
actually represent potential motor acts directed towards specific body parts101–104. The study on VIP neurons is of great 
interest because it shows that the mirror mechanism of this area encodes body-directed rather than object-directed 
motor acts, thus opening fascinating possibilities for individuals to encode the body of others.
Thus, the function of mirror neurons is related to the motor properties of the areas in which they are located. This is also 
true for adjacent areas located in the same cortical region.
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information about the goal of the observed motor acts. 
This information can be encoded with different degrees of 
generality: some mirror neurons (strictly congruent mir-
ror neurons) fire when the observed and executed motor 
acts are the same (for example, grasping with precision 
grip), whereas other mirror neurons (broadly congruent 
mirror neurons) fire when the observed motor act has the 
same goal as the executed motor act (for example, grasp-
ing), but can be achieved in a different way (for example, 
with both precision and whole-hand grips)43–44.
Recently, a single-neuron study investigated the 
effect of the spatial relationships between an agent and 
an observer, comparing F5 mirror neuron responses 
to motor acts performed near the monkey (in the 
peripersonal space) or outside its reach (in the extra-
personal space)45 (FIG. 3). The results showed that many 
F5 mirror neurons were differentially modulated by the 
location of the observed motor act. Some neurons were 
selective for actions executed in the monkey’s peripersonal 
space, whereas others were selective for stimuli in the 
extrapersonal space. These findings indicate that mirror 
neurons may encode the goal of the motor acts of another 
individual in an observer-centred spatial framework, 
thus providing the observer with crucial information for 
organizing their own future behaviour in cooperation or 
competition with the observed individuals.
Goal and single-movement coding in humans. In 
accordance with early findings46–49, a series of new fMRI 
studies provided strong evidence that the human parieto- 
frontal mirror circuit encodes the goal of observed motor 
acts. volunteers were instructed to observe video clips in 
which either a human or a robot arm grasped objects50. 
despite differences in shape and kinematics between 
the human and robot arms, the parieto-frontal mirror 
circuit was activated in both conditions. Another group 
extended these results by investigating cortical activation 
in response to the observation of motor acts performed 
by a human hand, a robot hand or a tool51. Here, bilat-
eral activation of a mirror network formed by intra-
parietal and ventral premotor cortex occured, regardless 
of the effector. In addition, the observation of tool 
actions produced a specific activation of a rostral sector 
of the left anterior supramarginal gyrus, suggesting 
that this sector specifically evolved for tool use.
Further evidence of goal encoding by the parieto-
frontal mirror circuit was obtained in an fMRI experi-
ment in which two aplasic individuals, born without 
arms and hands, and control volunteers were asked to 
watch video clips showing hand actions52. All partici-
pants also performed actions with their feet, mouth and, 
in the case of controls, hands. The results showed that 
the parieto-frontal mirror circuit of aplasic individuals 
that was active during movements of the feet and mouth 
was also recruited by the observation of hand motor acts 
that they have never executed but the motor goals of 
which they could achieve using their feet or mouth.
The issue of whether the human parieto-frontal mir-
ror network encodes motor goals was also addressed 
by fMRI and TMS studies investigating the activation 
of motor areas in subjects listening to action-related 
sounds. Hearing and categorizing animal vocalizations 
preferentially activated the middle portion of the supe-
rior temporal gyri bilaterally (a region that is not related 
to motor act coding), whereas hearing and categoriz-
ing sounds of tools that were manipulated by hands 
activated the parieto-frontal mirror circuit53. Similarly, 
it was shown that listening to the sound of hand and 
mouth motor acts activated the parieto-frontal mirror 
network54. This activation was somatotopically organ-
ized in the left premotor cortex and was congruent with 
the motor somatotopy of hand and mouth actions.
unlike in monkeys, the parieto-frontal mirror circuit 
of humans also becomes active during the observation of 
individual movements55–56. The initial evidence for this 
mechanism was based on TMS experiments which indi-
cated that the observation of the movements of others 
results in an activation of the muscles involved in the 
Figure 2 | Goal coding in the monkey premotor cortex. 
a | Schematic illustration of the experimental paradigm. 
To grasp the object with normal pliers, the monkey has 
to close its hand (top) whereas, with the reverse pliers, 
the monkey has to open its hand (bottom). The arrows 
indicate the direction of the motion of the tip of the pliers.  
b | Activity of a neuron recorded from area F5. Rasters and 
histograms illustrate the neuronal discharge during grasping 
with normal pliers (left) and reverse pliers (right). Both rasters 
and histograms are aligned with the end of the tip closure 
phase (asterisks). The traces below each histogram indicate 
the instantaneous hand position as recorded with a 
potentiometer and expressed as a function of the distance 
between the plier handles. Downwards traces indicate that 
the hand closes, whereas upwards traces indicate that the 
hand opens. Figure is reproduced, with permission, from 
REF. 39 © (2008) National Academy of Sciences.
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execution of those movements32–36. Additional support 
comes from eeG and MeG studies showing that the 
observation of movements without a goal desynchronizes 
the rhythms recorded from motor areas57–64.
Recently, it was shown that mirror coding might 
depend on the content of the observed behaviour. Motor 
evoked potentials (Meps) in response to TMS were 
recorded from the right opponens pollicis (Op) muscle 
in participants observing an experimenter either open-
ing and closing normal and reverse pliers or using them 
to grasp objects65. The observation of tool movements 
(that is, opening and closing the pliers without grasping 
anything) activated a cortical representation of the hand 
movements involved in the observed motor behaviour. 
by contrast, the observation of the tool grasping action 
activated a cortical representation of the observed motor 
goal, irrespective of the individual movements and the 
order of movements required to achieve it. Together, these 
findings show that the human parieto-frontal mirror 
network encodes both motor acts and movements.
Understanding the actions of others
Cognitive functions of the parieto-frontal network: 
evidence and criticisms. why should the motor sys-
tem encode the goal of actions performed by others? 
From the discovery of mirror neurons, the interpreta-
tion of this finding was that they allow the observer to 
understand directly the goal of the actions of others1–3: 
observing actions performed by another individual elic-
its a motor activation in the brain of the observer similar 
to that which occurs when the observer plans their own 
actions, and the similarity between these two activations 
allows the observer to understand the actions of others 
without needing inferential processing43–44.
In support of this view, two studies showed that the 
meaning of the motor acts of other individuals could 
be understood in the absence of visual information 
describing them. In one study, monkeys heard the 
sounds of a motor act (such as ripping a piece of paper) 
without seeing it66; in the other study, the monkeys 
knew that behind a screen was an object and saw the 
experimenter’s hand disappear behind the screen, but 
they could not see any hand–object interaction67. The 
results showed that in both experiments F5 mirror neu-
rons in the monkeys fired in the absence of visual infor-
mation describing the motor act of the experimenter. 
The neuronal activation therefore underpinned the 
comprehension of the goal of the motor act of the other 
individual, regardless of the sensory information that 
described that motor act.
This interpretation of the function of the parieto-frontal 
mirror mechanism has been challenged with objections 
and alternative proposals68–71. A key criticism has been 
advanced by csibra69. He argued that the interpretation of 
Figure 3 | Mirror neuron responses in the monkey during observation of actions executed in the peripersonal 
and extrapersonal space. a | Schematic illustration of the experimental paradigm. The monkey observes an 
experimenter grasping an object in its extrapersonal space (upper panel) and in its peripersonal space (middle 
panel). The monkey grasps an object located in front of it (lower panel). b | Responses of three neurons in the three 
experimental conditions. Neuron 1 responds selectively to the observation of action in the extrapersonal space, 
whereas neuron 2 responds to the observation of action in the peripersonal space. Neuron 3 does not exhibit space 
selectivity. All three neurons also discharge during action execution. Figure is reproduced, with permission, from 
REF. 45 © (2009) American Association for the Advancement of Science.
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TMS adaptation paradigm
A paradigm by which specific 
neural populations within 
the stimulated cortical 
region can be targeted. 
One population is ‘adapted’ 
and will therefore be less 
active. Because transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS)
targets less active neural 
populations, the adapted 
population will be facilitated 
more strongly by TMS
Inferential reasoning
The capacity to attribute 
to an agent mental states 
that might account for the 
observed motor action in terms 
of the reasons (for example, 
needs, desires and beliefs) 
underlying it.
mirror neuron function in terms of action understanding 
contains a “tension” between “the claim that the mirror 
mechanism reflects nothing else but faithful duplication 
of the observed action” and “the claim that mirroring rep-
resents high-level interpretation of the observed action”. 
In other words, if mirror activity represents a copy of the 
observed motor act, it is not sufficiently general to capture 
the goal of that motor act; conversely, if it is sufficiently 
general for goal understanding, it cannot be interpreted 
in terms of a direct matching mechanism between sensory 
and motor representations (see also REFS 70,71).
In the earlier studies on the mirror mechanism, it 
was indeed not clearly specified that the parieto-frontal 
mirror mechanism in humans is involved in two kinds 
of sensory–motor transformation — one mapping the 
observed movements onto the observer’s own motor 
representation of those movements (movement mirror-
ing), the other mapping the goal of the observed motor 
act onto the observer’s own motor representation of that 
motor act (goal mirroring), as described above. by match-
ing individual movements, mirror processing provides a 
representation of body part movements that might serve 
various functions (for example, imitation), but is devoid 
of any specific cognitive importance per se. by contrast, 
through matching the goal of the observed motor act 
with a motor act that has the same goal, the observer is 
able to understand what the agent is doing. This is true 
not only for the mirror neurons that are broadly congru-
ent but also for those that are strictly congruent, because 
these neurons also do not encode the elementary aspects 
of a movement (for example, its kinematics), but respond 
to the goal of the observed motor acts44,56.
Typically, authors who play down or even deny the 
importance of the motor system for cognitive functions 
suggest that goal understanding is primarily due to 
cortical activation in the STS. This region, as described 
in a series of fundamental studies in monkeys72,73, is 
involved in the visual analysis of the actions of others. 
Several fMRI studies showed a similar role for the STS 
in humans (see REFS 74,75 for a review).
There is little doubt that STS neurons have an impor-
tant role in encoding the behaviour of others. However, it 
is unlikely that the STS by itself mediates the processing of 
action understanding, relegating the parieto-frontal mir-
ror network to an ancillary role in this function65: among 
the neurons in various areas that become active during 
action observation, only those that can encode the goal of 
the motor behaviour of another individual with the great-
est degree of generality can be considered to be crucial for 
action understanding, and the available evidence shows that 
this capacity for generalization characterizes the parieto- 
frontal mirror neurons rather than STS cells. Indeed, pari-
eto-frontal mirror neurons encode the goal of observed 
motor acts regardless of whether they are performed with 
the mouth, the hand or even with tools. Although STS 
neurons may encode some types of motor act, goal gener-
alization such as is achieved by the parieto-frontal mirror 
neurons seems to be absent in the STS72,73.
Most importantly, there are theoretical reasons 
why STS neurons are unlikely to encode actions with 
the same degree of generality as parieto-frontal mirror 
neurons. If an STS neuron selectively encodes the visual 
features of a given hand action (for example, grasping), it 
is unclear how this neuron would also be able to encode 
selectively the visual features of a mouth performing 
the same motor act. One could postulate an associa-
tion process similar to that described for the temporal 
lobe76,77. However, in the STS, the association would be 
between spatio-temporally adjacent visual representa-
tions of body part movements and not between visual 
representations of the same motor goal achieved by 
different effectors. by contrast, parieto-frontal mirror 
neurons — owing to their motor nature and the fact 
that they encode the goal of motor acts — can be trig-
gered by different visual stimuli (for example, hand and 
mouth actions) that have a common goal (for example, 
grasping). Only the presence of a ‘motor scaffold’ that 
provides the goal-related aspects of observed actions can 
allow this generalization; such generalization cannot be 
achieved by mere visual association.
A recent study provides empirical evidence in favour 
of this point78. The study was based on a TMS adaptation 
paradigm79. participants were presented with ‘adapta-
tion-inducing’ movies of a hand or foot acting on vari-
ous objects and asked to respond as quickly as possible 
to a picture of a motor act similar to that of the movie. 
TMS pulses were delivered over the ventral premotor 
cortex bilaterally, over the left Ipl and over the left STS. 
The results showed that the delivery of TMS over both 
premotor and Ipl cortices shortened the reaction times 
to ‘adapted’ motor acts regardless of which effector 
performed the observed motor act; by contrast, TMS 
stimulation of the STS shortened the reaction times to 
‘adapted’ motor acts only if the same effector executed 
the act in the movie and in the test picture.
Understanding actions from the inside. Another argu-
ment against the role of mirror neurons in action under-
standing is that there are several behavioural instances 
in which individuals understand the actions of others 
even if they are unable to perform them. For example, 
macaques can react to the observation of humans mak-
ing the gesture of throwing objects overhand towards 
them80. It was proposed that, although monkeys never 
throw objects overhand, they could nevertheless under-
stand the action they saw because they analysed the vari-
ous visual elements of the observed actions and applied 
some form of inferential reasoning.
However, this argument would only be valid if the 
parieto-frontal mirror mechanism consisted solely of 
strictly congruent mirror neurons. As the authors of the 
study themselves recognize80, the capacity of broadly 
congruent mirror neurons to generalize the goal of 
motor acts might account for the observed phenome-
non. Given that broadly congruent mirror neurons may 
generalize from a hand action to actions performed with 
tools, even when they are as bizarre as reverse pliers, it 
is plausible that they could equally generalize from one 
type of throwing to another.
There is no doubt that, in some cases, understanding 
the motor behaviour of others might require a mechanism 
different from mirroring. A typical example is the capacity 
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of humans to recognize the actions of animals that do 
not belong to the human motor repertoire and cannot be 
captured by a motor generalization. evidence for a non-
mirror mechanism in action recognition was provided by 
an fMRI study in which volunteers were presented with 
video clips showing motor acts that did or did not belong 
to the human motor repertoire81. Although all volunteers 
recognized the observed motor acts regardless of whether 
or not they belonged to their own motor repertoire, no 
activation of parieto-frontal mirror areas was found in 
response to acts that did not belong to their motor reper-
toire (for example, a dog barking). The areas that became 
active in such cases were occipital visual and STS areas. 
by contrast, the sight of motor acts that were within the 
motor repertoire of the observer (for example, a dog 
biting) recruited the parieto-frontal mirror network.
These data indicate that the recognition of the motor 
behaviour of others can rely on the mere processing 
of its visual aspects. This processing is similar to that 
performed by the ‘ventral stream’ areas for the recogni-
tion of inanimate objects. It allows the labelling of the 
observed behaviour, but does not provide the observer 
with cues that are necessary for a real understanding of 
the conveyed message (for example, the communica-
tive intent of the barking dog). by contrast, when the 
observed action impinges on the motor system through 
the mirror mechanism, that action is not only visu-
ally labelled but also understood, because the motor 
representation of its goal is shared by the observer and 
the agent. In other words, the observed action is under-
stood from the inside as a motor possibility and not just 
from the outside as a mere visual experience (BOX 2).
Understanding motor intentions of others
From motor goals to motor intentions. The properties of 
parieto-frontal mirror neurons described above indicate 
that their activity reflects what is going on in the ‘here 
and now’. However, there is evidence that parietal and 
frontal mirror neurons are involved in encoding not 
only the observed motor acts but also the entire action 
of which the observed motor act is part. Monkeys were 
trained to grasp objects with two different motor inten-
tions: to place them into a container or to bring them to 
their mouth11. After training, motor neurons in the Ipl 
that encode grasping were studied in the two set-ups. 
The results showed that the majority of these neurons 
discharged with an intensity that varied according to the 
action in which the motor act was embedded (‘action-
constrained motor neurons’). This finding implies 
that the Ipl contains ‘chains’ of neurons in which each 
neuron encodes a given motor act and is linked to oth-
ers that are selective for another specific motor act. 
Together, they encode a specific action (for example, 
grasping for eating).
A striking result of this study was that many of these 
action-constrained motor neurons have mirror proper-
ties. when tested in the two set-ups described above, 
the majority of these neurons were differently activated 
depending on the action to which the observed motor 
act belonged (‘action-constrained mirror neurons’). This 
finding indicates that, in addition to describing what the 
observed individual is doing (for example, grasping), Ipl 
mirror neurons also help the observer to explain why the 
individual is performing the action, owing to chained 
organization in the Ipl. That is, Ipl mirror neurons ena-
ble the observer to recognize the agent’s motor intention.
A recent study demonstrated that action-constrained 
neurons are also present in area F5 (REF. 82). The compar-
ison of F5 and Ipl (specifically area pFG) mirror neuron 
properties revealed no clear differences in their capacity 
to encode the motor intentions of others.
evidence that the parieto-frontal mirror circuit in 
humans is also involved in intention encoding was first 
provided by an fMRI experiment consisting of three 
conditions83. In the first (the ‘context condition’) the vol-
unteers saw a photo of some objects arranged as for an 
ongoing breakfast or arranged as though the breakfast had 
just finished; in the second (the ‘action condition’), the 
volunteers saw a photo of a hand grasping a mug without 
any context; in the third (the ‘intention condition’) they 
saw photos showing the same hand actions within the two 
contexts. In this condition, the context provided clues for 
understanding the intention of the motor act. The results 
showed that the intention condition induced a stronger 
activation than the other two conditions in the caudal 
inferior frontal gyrus of the right hemisphere.
An activation of the right parieto-frontal mirror cir-
cuit during intention understanding was also described 
in a repetition–suppression fMRI experiment 84. 
 Box 2 | Some (pseudo) problems for the mirror mechanism
In addition to the main objections to the role of the parieto-frontal mechanism in 
action understanding discussed in the main text, other ‘problems’ have been offered as 
evidence against the notion that the parieto-frontal mirror mechanism is involved in 
action understanding105. One problem derives from a transcranial magnetic stimulation 
experiment106 in which individuals were trained to move their fingers in a manner 
incongruent to that of the ‘teacher’. After training, motor-evoked potentials were 
greater in the muscle involved in the incongruent response than in the muscle involved 
in the congruent one. This incongruence, contrary to the authors’ claim, does not 
necessarily demonstrate the discovery of a new class of mirror neurons. It probably 
shows that one can inhibit a natural (mirror) response and voluntarily organize a 
different response to comply with instructions. However, regardless of what this 
experiment tells us about the role of the mirror mechanism in imitation, its results 
are unrelated to action understanding. The reason is that, in the task, there was nothing 
to understand: the investigated movements were meaningless.
A second argument is even more surprising. The claim105 is that, if the human 
parieto-frontal mirror system were involved in action understanding, motor 
syndromes following its damage (for example, ideomotor apraxia) would be accompanied 
by a deficit in action recognition. The assumption is that there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between motor and mirror sectors in the parieto-frontal circuit. This 
assumption is wrong. As clearly shown by electrophysiological mapping, there are motor 
sectors in the monkey inferior parietal lobule (and even in area PFG) with and without 
mirror neurons. Thus, dissociations between motor deficits and action understanding deficits 
can and do occur107. It is the opposite result — that specific action recognition deficits can 
occur following motor circuit damage108 — that is striking and that provides a compelling 
argument for the crucial role of mirror neurons in this function.
Finally, saxophone playing has been used as an example to show that the mirror 
view of action understanding is “untenable”: no motor competence is required to 
understand that someone is playing a saxophone105. This is true, but such competence 
leads to a different understanding of saxophone playing. The non-motor-based 
understanding implies a mere semantic knowledge of what a saxophone is for, whereas 
the motor experience allows an individual to understand what saxophone playing 
really means — that is, it provides a musical knowledge ‘from the inside’.
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Motor action
Several motor acts organized 
in a chain, leading to the 
achievement of a specific 
motor intention (for example, 
grasping a cup of coffee for 
drinking). The fulfilment of 
its motor intention represents 
the reinforcement of the 
motor action.
participants were presented with movies showing motor 
actions (for example, pushing or pulling a lid) that could 
lead to the same or to different outcomes (for example, 
opening or closing a box). The results showed that the 
responses in the right Ipl and right inferior frontal 
cortex were ‘suppressed’ when participants saw movies 
of motor actions that had the same outcome, regard-
less of the individual movements involved. Responses 
in these regions were not influenced by the kinematics 
parameters of the observed motor action.
brain imaging experiments allow the cortical sub-
strate of a given function to be located, but they do not 
give information about the mechanism underlying the 
function. cattaneo and colleagues tested whether 
the understanding of motor intention in humans might be 
based on the ‘chain mechanism’ described in the monkey85. 
participants were asked to grasp a piece of food and eat it 
or to grasp a piece of food and place it in a container. In 
another condition, they had to observe an experimenter 
performing the same actions. In both the execution and 
the observation condition, the electromyographic activity 
of the mylohyoid muscle — a muscle involved in mouth 
opening — was recorded. both the execution and the 
observation of the eating action produced a marked 
increase of mylohyoid muscle activity as early as the 
‘reaching’ phase, whereas no mylohyoid muscle activ-
ity was recorded during the execution and the observa-
tion of the placing action. This indicates that, as soon as 
the action starts, the entire motor programme for a given 
action is activated. Interestingly, the observers also seem 
to have a motor copy of this programme. This ‘intrusion’ 
allows them to predict what action the agent is going to 
execute from the first observed motor act and thus to 
understand the agent’s motor intention.
Finally, there is evidence that the mirror mechanism, 
possibly located in this case in the fronto-mesial areas, 
also has a role in setting up an anticipatory representation 
of the motor behaviour of another individual. It has been 
shown that the ‘bereitschaftspotential’, an electrophysio-
logical marker of the readiness to act86, occurs not only 
when an individual actively performs a motor act, but 
also when the nature and the onset time of an upcoming 
action performed by another individual is predictable on 
the basis of a visual cue87.
Mirroring intentions and inferring reasons. The studies 
reviewed above indicate that the parieto-frontal mirror 
network may subserve the understanding of the motor 
intention underlying the actions of others. This capacity 
represents a functional property of the parieto-frontal 
mirror network that further distinguishes it from those 
of visual areas. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how 
motor intention understanding could be based on visual 
processing alone, including visual processing that is car-
ried out in higher-order visual areas such as the STS. It is 
true that some STS neurons are selective for a sequence 
of stimuli. For example, in contrast to classical visual neu-
rons that respond to a specific static stimulus, some STS 
neurons respond to the static view of a body only when 
this stimulus occurs after a certain movement (for exam-
ple, walk and stop)88. However, despite this fascinating 
property, these neurons do not give information about 
the agent’s motor intention: they describe a given motor 
act according to a previous motor behaviour, but they 
do not provide information about the motor intention 
underlying that motor act.
This does not mean that the parieto-frontal mirror 
mechanism mediates all varieties of intention under-
standing. Intention understanding is a multi-layer process 
involving different levels of action representation, from 
the motor intention that drives a given chain of motor 
acts to the propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires and 
so on) that — at least in humans — can be assumed to 
explain the observed behaviour in terms of its plausible 
psychological reasons.
we provide an example to clarify this point. Mary is 
interacting with an object (for example, a cup). According 
to how she is grasping the cup, we can understand why 
she is doing it (for example, to drink from it or to move 
it). This kind of understanding can be mediated by the 
parieto-frontal mirror mechanism by virtue of its motor 
chain organization. However, the mirror mechanism is 
not able to provide us with the reasons that might underlie 
the motor intention of Mary (for example, she grasped the 
cup to drink from it because she was thirsty or because she 
wanted some caffeine, or she did it to please her friends). 
understanding the reasons behind an agent’s motor inten-
tion requires additional inferential processes89–91.
Recent empirical data confirmed these considera-
tions. They showed that, although the parieto-frontal 
mirror mechanism is active in all conditions in which 
the motor task has to be directly understood, when vol-
unteers were required to judge the reasons behind the 
observed actions, there was an activation of a sector of 
the anterior cingulate cortex and of other areas of the 
so-called ‘mentalizing network’92. Activation of the same 
network was also shown in a study that investigated unu-
sual actions performed in implausible versus plausible 
contexts93, as well as in a study on the neural basis of 
reason inference in non-stereotypical actions94.
As there are different levels of action representation, 
there should be diverse neural mechanisms subserv-
ing these different levels of intention understanding. 
understanding motor intention relies on the parieto-
frontal mirror mechanism and the motor chain organi-
zation of the cortical motor system. understanding the 
reason behind motor intention seems to be localized in 
cortical areas — the temporal parietal junction and a 
part of the anterior cingulate gyrus — that have not as 
yet been shown to have mirror properties. There have 
been theoretical attempts to integrate these two ways of 
understanding the intentions of others95–96. nonetheless, 
unlike for the mirror mechanism, there are currently no 
neurophysiological data that can explain how the ‘mental-
izing network’ might work.
Conclusions
The mirror mechanism is a neurophysiological find-
ing that has raised considerable interest over the past 
few years. It provides a basic mechanism that unifies 
action production and action observation, allowing the 
understanding of the actions of others from the inside. 
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 Box 3 | The mirror mechanism and autism
Autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) is a syndrome characterized by impairment in social skills, communicative abilities, 
emotional responses and motor behaviour109–113. Over the past few years, a number of electrophysiological and brain 
imaging experiments62,114–117 showed that individuals with ASD have an impairment of the mirror mechanism, suggesting 
that the social ‘aloneness’ that is typical of an individual with ASD might result from this deficit118–120. Recently, some 
behavioural studies have challenged this view121–123. The studies showed that the capacity of children with ASD to 
understand the goal of observed motor acts — a function of mirror neurons — is preserved and that the mirror hypothesis 
of ASD should therefore be considered incorrect124.
How can the discrepancy between imaging and electrophysiological findings and behavioural data be explained? An 
answer has been provided by a study in which children with ASD were asked to grasp a piece of food either for eating or 
for placing in a container (see the figure, part a) and, in another set-up, to observe an experimenter performing these 
actions85. The activity of the mylohyoid (MH) muscle, which is involved in mouth opening, was recorded to produce an 
electromyograph (EMG). Unlike typically developing children, in whom MH activation was already present during the 
reaching and grasping phases of the grasping-for-eating action (see the figure, part b, left), children with ASD showed MH 
activation only during the bringing-to-the-mouth phase (see the figure, part c, left). Furthermore, typically developing 
children exhibited MH activation when observing a grasping-for-eating action, whereas children with ASD did not (see 
the figure, parts b and c, right). The interpretation of these data is straightforward: children with ASD have a severe 
impairment in motor organization that includes a deficit in chaining motor acts into intentional actions. Thus, during 
action observation the intentional motor chains are not activated. Therefore, the intentions of others do not ‘intrude’ into 
the mirror system of children with ASD and these intentions are not understood ‘from the inside’ but only ‘from the 
outside’. This interpretation is supported by a recent study showing that to understand the intentions of other people, 
children with ASD do not rely on the observed motor behaviour but on the semantics of the object that is being 
manipulated or on the context in which the motor act takes place125. Figure is reproduced, with permission from REF. 85  
© (2007) National Academy of Sciences.
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Such motor-based understanding seems to be a pri-
mary way in which individuals relate to one another, 
as shown by its presence not only in humans and mon-
keys, but also in evolutionarily distant species, such 
as swamp sparrows4 and zebra finches5. Furthermore, 
this mechanism indicates the existence of a profound 
natural link between individuals that is crucial for 
establishing inter-individual interactions. Finally, 
preliminary evidence suggests that the impairment of 
this natural link may be one of the causes of the strik-
ing inability of people with autism to relate to other 
individuals (BOX 3).
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